Exploring Saving Performance in an IDA for People With Disabilities: Some Preliminary Findings by Lombe, Margaret et al.
 Campus Box 1196  One Brookings Drive  St. Louis, MO  63130-9906    (314) 935.7433    www.gwbweb.wustl.edu/csd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exploring Saving Performance in an 
IDA for People with Disabilities 
Some Preliminary Findings 
 
Margaret Lombe 
Boston College 
 
Jin Huang 
Center for Social Development 
 
Michelle Putnam 
Simmons College 
 
Kate Cooney 
Boston University 
 
2008 
 
Subsequent publication: Lombe, M., Huang, J., Putnam, M., & Cooney, K. (2010). Exploring 
saving performance in an IDA for people with disabilities: Some preliminary findings. Social 
Work Research 24(2), 83-93. 
 
CSD Working Papers 
No. 08-27 
E X P L O R I N G  S A V I N G  P E R F O R M A N C E  I N  A N  I D A  F O R  P E O P L E  W I T H  D I S A B I L I T I E S  
 
 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
1 
Exploring Saving Performance in an IDA for 
People with Disabilities: Some Preliminary Findings 
 
Asset development policies have been promoted as a means to create a more inclusive “ownership society.” During the 
past few years, asset building scholarship has begun to focus specifically on marginalized groups including persons with 
disabilities. Using a sample of Individual Development Account (IDA) program participants (N=376), we examine 
effects of disability status on IDA saving performance; we also assess variations in saving performance by individual 
and programmatic characteristics.  Our results suggest that disability status, in addition to a number of individual and 
program characteristics, is associated with saving performance in an IDA.  Implications for practice and scholarship 
are presented. 
Key words: asset, development, disability, savings, IDA 
 
An Overview of the Issue 
The steady increases in levels of marginalization and unequal distribution of wealth in the United 
States over the past three decades has prompted interest in anti-poverty policy that expands the 
wealth of individuals currently in poverty through asset building strategies such as individual 
development accounts (IDAs) (Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner, & Edwards, 2005; Sherraden, 1991).  
IDAs1 are among asset accumulation programs that are increasingly being presented as a primarily 
vehicle through which individuals and households with limited economic resources and 
opportunities can gain a foothold on the American economic ladder (Boyle & Boguslaw, 2007; 
Sherraden, 2001; Stoesz & Saunders, 1999). IDAs are unique in that a specific savings goal—such as 
a down-payment on a home, small business capitalization, advanced education, or retirement—are 
identified by participants.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, a number of policies promoting IDAs for asset building among low-income 
individuals and households have been put in place. An example of these is the 1996 Welfare Reform 
Act which included IDAs as a state option, allowing states to use funds from block grants for 
matched savings accounts for low-income individuals and households without counting the savings 
towards prevailing asset limits in means-tested programs (Edwards & Rist, 2001). Another example 
is the 1998 Assets for Independence Act (AFIA), that authorized $125 million to be used in account 
matching and limited administrative funds for an IDA demonstration over a five-year period. 
Current estimates are that over 500 IDA programs have been developed in the United States since 
1991 (Edwards & Rist, 2001; Schreiner et al., 2001) with upwards of 50,000 IDA accounts in 
operation (CFED, 2007).  
                                                 
1IDAs are a special saving accounts targeted at the working poor (mainly those under 200 percent of the federal-poverty 
guideline.  In these programs, the poor are encouraged to save. The deposits in IDAs are matched (the match rate ranges from 1:1 
to 6:1).  The matched savings can be used for investing in any of the following assets: microenterprise, homeownership, post-
secondary education, or retirement (Sherraden et al., 2000 provide a detailed description of each of these programs).  
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Previous research within the context of the American Dream Demonstration (ADD), the first 
national policy IDA demonstration, has began to demonstrate that poor people can save, albeit in 
small amounts, and accumulate assets (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2006). Although IDA program 
participants in ADD included a significant number of persons with disabilities, disability itself has 
not yet been examined as a factor that may potentially influence savings outcomes. To our 
knowledge, there is no existing empirical evidence from research on IDA participants that has 
examined outcomes for persons with disabilities. The lack of specific research on disability status 
and IDA performance makes it difficult to ascertain if the outcomes of IDA participation are any 
different for persons with disabilities or if the effects of institutional and individual characteristics on 
saving performance vary by disability status.  It is well known in the fields of medical and social 
science that people with disabilities often face additional social and physical environmental burdens 
for inclusion and participation. Based on this knowledge, we expect that disability status may be 
important to consider in understanding IDA savings and participation outcomes. 
  
In this paper, we present an exploration of ADD data to examine the influence of disability. 
Specifically, we compare savings outcomes in the form of average monthly net deposit (AMND) 
between program participants with disabilities and those without disabilities, and the influence of 
individual, household, and institutional characteristics on AMND. Our theoretical perspective 
acknowledges social models of disability and the emerging institutional theory of saving as useful 
frameworks for understanding how assets may influence the experience of disability and how 
institutional characteristics may influence saving among persons with disabilities (see Putnam, 
Sherraden, Edwards, Porterfield, & Wittenberg, et al., 2005). We view these analyses as preliminary 
as they utilized data from the first three waves of data collection at the ADD experimental site, 
Community Action Program of Tulsa County (CAPTC), in which disability status is created from 
proxy variables. Wave 4 of CAPTC data collection is in progress and should be completed within 
two years. Wave 5 contains disability self-identification items that permit construction of a more 
robust sample than can be compared against this proxy-based sample. This will provide a more 
rigorous sample base for analysis and a new time point (post-IDA participation) for review. 
 
Research on IDA Participant Outcomes: A Review of the Literature 
 
Largely due to disability rights activism and civil rights policy, persons with disabilities are making 
significant progress in dispelling negative stereotypes and reducing social, environmental, and 
political barriers to community integration and engagement. Asset-building policies may facilitate 
these outcomes in addition to building financial assets (With Equity and Assets for All, 2003). IDA 
demonstration projects that target or actively solicit people with disabilities as participants are just 
beginning to be initiated and collect data (AATPP, 2004). These include the LIFE accounts program 
in New Hampshire (Davies, 2006) and the collection of disability-related data on IDA program 
participants in California (World Institute on Disability, 2002). While important efforts, 
understanding of asset development for persons with disabilities is hindered somewhat by the 
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limited information about asset holdings and savings intentions among the population of persons 
with disabilities in general. What is known about the financial status of people with disabilities is that 
a noteworthy percentage (75%) of individuals with significant impairment are unemployed, the 
overall poverty rate of the working-age people with disabilities was 25.3% in 2006 (Cornell 
University, 2006) and the rate of household deprivation as measured by food insecurity is 
considerably high (Huang & Guo, 2008; She & Livermore, 2007).  
 
ADD research has shown that low-income individuals can save money in IDA accounts. ADD’s 
findings indicate that participation in and the savings outcomes of IDAs vary by  individual 
participant characteristics including marital status, gender, race/ethnicity, or existing asset ownership 
(Curley & Grinstein-Weiss, 2003; Grinstein-Weiss & Sherraden, 2004; Schreiner, Clancy, & 
Sherraden, 2002). Specifically, holding other factors constant, TANF recipients, unemployed people, 
and very-low income people saved less. In terms of household composition, married couples had 
the best savings outcomes in IDAs, but single mothers had better outcomes than non-married men 
or women. In addition, participants who owned external assets had higher IDA savings than those 
who did not. (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2006). Taken together, these findings suggest that certain 
individual level characteristics do influence IDA outcomes and provide support for inclusion of 
disability as a factor worthy of consideration in IDA analyses. 
 
Institutional characteristics of IDA policies and programs, broadly conceived to include: (1) access, 
(2) information, (3) incentives, (4) facilitation, and (5) expectations, have also demonstrated 
significant influence on savings outcomes (Sherraden, Schreiner & Beverly 2003). Again, ADD 
serves as the primary data source for these findings with incentives such as match rates and savings 
targets and information such as financial education emerging as key institutional characteristics 
(Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 2003; Sherraden, 2008).  
 
Evidence suggests variable effects of match rate including a decreased risk of unmatched 
withdrawals and lower program exits with higher match rates (Schreiner, Sherraden, Clancy, 
Johnson, & Curley, et al., 2001) and a leveling out of saving at a 2:1 match rate after which higher 
match rates did not increase participant saving (Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004). Support is robust for 
the positive effects of monthly savings targets and required financial education within IDA 
programs. Both are significantly related to increased savings outcomes in ADD (Schreiner et al., 
2001; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2006) and for the subsample of ADD participants saving in an IDA 
for microenterprise (Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004). However, in a pattern similar to the findings for 
match rate, returns on hours of financial education plateau between 6 and 12 hours beyond which 
hours of financial education cease to be influential (Clancy, Grinstein-Weiss, and Schreiner, 2001; 
Schreiner & Sherraden, 2006; Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004). Other institutional factors have also 
demonstrated significance. Greater deposit access in physical locations (Ssewamala & Sherraden, 
2004) and facilitated access through direct deposit are related to increased savings among ADD 
participants (Putnam, Sherraden, Zhang, & Morrow-Howell, 2008).  
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It is important to note that previous research using ADD data show that institutional factors operate 
differently for different subgroups.  Specifically, black ADD participants compared to white 
participants appear to be more incentivized by match rates, have better savings performance when 
they had previous experience with banks through a checking account, and have lower increases in 
savings from financial education (Grinstein-Weiss & Sherraden, 2004). 
 
In short, ADD research has found that institutional characteristics matter and should be assessed as 
part of studying IDA programs and their results. Although there are no disability-specific 
institutional measures in the ADD data set such as physical accessibility or social acceptance of 
disability, the existing institutional factors are contributing to a new, institutional theory of saving 
that begins to provide a larger environmental assessment of saving. Recent evaluation of savings 
within Medicaid’s Cash and Counseling demonstration program provides evidence that poor people 
with disabilities do save money when institutional supports are available (Lombe, Putnam, & Huang, 
2008). Yet, to our knowledge, no analysis has been conducted to understand if or how the 
importance of institutional characteristics might be different for participants with disabilities within 
the context of an IDA program. 
 
Research Questions 
 
This study explores the relationship between disability status and saving performance (as measured 
by average monthly net deposit) in an IDA using existing data from ADD’s CAPTC random 
controlled trial. We asked 1) If disability status impacts average monthly net deposit in an IDA and 
2) If yes, do (a) individual and household characteristics, and (b) institutional characteristics, 
influence the impact of disability on average monthly net deposit? Our aim is to develop a beginning 
understanding of how people with disabilities fair in IDA programs and if their savings outcomes 
significantly vary from those of people in IDA program who do not experience disability.  
 
Methods 
 
Data description 
These analyses used data from the American Dream Demonstration (ADD), the first national policy 
demonstration of Individual Development Accounts for individuals and households in poverty. 
ADD enrolled and followed 2,351 participants at 14 community-based IDA program sites across the 
United States from 1997 until 2003.  Participants’ deposits in IDAs were matched by funds from 
either a public or private source. Each of the 14 IDAs targeted low-income individuals and had the 
same program features. However, each program selected its own income eligibility threshold (the 
majority mandated incomes of less than 200% of the federal poverty line); set its match rate, 
required hours of financial education, and other program structural (institutional) features such as 
IDA saving usages which included microenterprise, homeownership, post-secondary education, and 
retirement. For a full description of the ADD study, its history, methods, and overall participant 
outcomes please see Schreiner and associates (2001) as well as Schreiner and Sherraden (2006). 
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We used two primary data sources within ADD: 1) longitudinal data from survey interviews with 
participants in ADD’s random controlled trial at the Community Action Program of Tulsa County 
(CAPTC), one of ADD’s 14 IDA sites located in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and 2) administrative data 
collected by CAPTC using Management Information System for Individual Development Accounts 
(MIS IDA) software which tracks program and participant characteristics as well as all IDA saving 
transactions. The CAPTC experimental data were collected by Abt Associates from October 1998 
through September 2003 using a sample of qualified participants, pre-screened and referred by 
CAPTC.  These participants (N=1,103) were randomly assigned to an experimental group (n=537) 
that was enrolled in the IDA program and a control group (n=566) that was not. Surveys were 
administered to all CAPTC participants (both experimental and control) at three time points: 1) 
immediately after group assignment through face-to-face interviews; and through telephone 
interviews 2) at 18 months after enrollment, and 3) at 48 months after enrollment. Alternate 
methods and accommodations for data collection were employed when needed including language 
translation, and substitution of in-person and telephone interviews. No formal disability-specific 
accommodations were universally employed (see Schreiner and Sherraden, 2006, for detailed 
discussion of interview methods). A total of 1,103 participants completed the first wave of the 
survey; 933 participants (85% response rate) completed the second (n=461 in the experimental 
group, n=472 in the control group); 840 participants (76% response rate) completed the third wave 
of the survey (n=412 in the experimental group, n=428 in the control group).  CAPTC participants 
had to complete the IDA program (through Wave 3 data collection in 2003) to receive the IDA 
match funds. Participants who dropped out earlier could make unmatched withdrawals at any time 
during the experiment prior to its conclusion. 
 
Sample description  
Three criteria were used to select the sample for these analyses. First, only ADD participants in the 
experimental group were included (n=537). The control group did not participate in the IDA 
program, and therefore their saving performance in IDAs could not be examined. Second, 
participants must have been interviewed in both Waves 2 and 3 as disability status was measured by 
several proxy variables only present in data collection Waves 2 and 3 (n=412). Third, participants 
who had missing values for the variables used to construct disability status or had missing values on 
the variable of average monthly net deposit (the dependent variable of this study) were deleted from 
the sample. This resulted in an exclusion of 161 participants.  The final sample used in these analyses 
is N=376. Presented in Table 1, our comparisons demonstrated that this sample was not statistically 
different from those excluded cases in the original CAPTC experimental group sample with the 
following exception: this sample was older at baseline. Once the sample was determined, a weight 
variable provided by the ADD longitudinal experiment data (CAPTC) was used to adjust for the 
different treatment-control ratio creating a balanced sample for analysis (Grinstein-Weiss, Lee, Irish, 
& Han, 2007).  
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Table 1. Comparison between the study sample and the experimental group of CAPTC 
Variables Study Sample (N=376) Excluded Sample (N=161) 
 Mean or Freq SD or % Mean or Freq SD or % 
Individual Characteristics     
Gender (female) 300 79.79 119 73.91 
Age in Wave I** 36.48 10.48 33.61 9.75 
Education levels     
        <=high school 118 31.38 62 38.51 
        Some college/Two-year college 209 55.59 83 51.55 
        Four-year college or above 65 13.03 16 9.94 
Race     
        White 169 44.95 62 38.51 
        Black 162 43.09 71 44.10 
        Others 45 11.97 28 17.39 
Marital status in Wave I (Yes) 107 28.46 42 26.09 
Employment status in Wave I (employed) 375 99.73 157 97.52 
Household Characteristics     
Household size in Wave I 3.45 1.77 3.20 1.52 
Number of children in Wave I 1.60 1.37 1.50 1.43 
Household income in Wave I 1548.25 1319.54 1405.30 712.19 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 (comparison between study sample and excluded sample) 
 
Measures  
These analyses employed one principal saving performance dependent variable, average monthly net 
deposit, and one principal independent variable, disability status. Individual, household, and 
program (institutional) characteristics were used as control variables.  A brief description of these 
variables is presented below.  
 
Average monthly net deposit. Saving performance is measured a number of different ways in ADD 
including levels (amount) of savings and frequency of savings. Average Monthly Net Deposit 
(AMND) is defined as the net deposit per month for the period in which the participant is engaged 
in the IDA program. AMND is believed to be a basic building block for asset accumulation. It is a 
reliable measure as data is obtained directly from depository financial institutions through MIS IDA. 
In addition, it controls for length of participating in the program (Schreiner et al., 2001). Consistent 
with other ADD studies (e.g., Lombe & Sherraden, 2008; Schreiner, et al., 2001; Sherraden, et al., 
2000), we selected AMND as our dependent variable. For this study, AMND is lagged from Waves 
1 through 3, representing a participant’s performance in the IDA program for the total contact 
period.   
 
Disability status. The ADD longitudinal experiment survey (Waves 1-3) did not specifically ask 
participants to identify themselves as having a disability. However, we identified three variables in 
Waves 2 and 3 to serve as proxies for disability status: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
receipt, Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI) receipt,2 and illness or disability as a cause for not 
                                                 
2 Only SSI recipients who were younger than 65 are considered as people with disabilities in this study. 
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currently working.  We created a dichotomous measure of disability status based on these proxy 
variables: Participants with a positive response on any of these questions in either Wave 2 or 3 were 
considered as experiencing a disability in these analyses. Since the three proxy variables only measure 
receipt of disability insurance benefits and employment limitation, this measure is, by default, a 
potentially biased measure of disability status.   
 
Individual and household characteristics. Individual or personal traits included in this analysis taken from 
Wave I data include the participant’s gender (categorical), age at the time of entrance into the IDA 
program (interval), level of educational attainment (3 level categorical), and race/ethnicity which is 
measured in three categories: white, black and other for reasons of parsimony. Employment status 
(employed or unemployed) and marital status (married or not married) are taken from Wave 3. 
Household characteristics include household size (interval), number of children (interval) and 
children present in household (dichotomous), and household income (interval). 
 
Program characteristics (Institutional factors). Four program characteristics were evaluated in this analysis 
covering two key institutional factors: information (operationalized as hours of education) and 
facilitation (operationalized as hours of program and staff contact).  CAPTC IDA participants were 
required to enroll for a minimum number of hours of general financial education and asset-specific 
financial education pertaining to their savings goal (e.g. home purchase, retirement, small business 
ownership). Participants could attend more hours if desired: some participants did not attend all of 
the required hours. Hours of general and asset-specific financial education are measured by two 
separate interval variables to capture the information-related institutional factor. Number of hours of 
contact with IDA program staff per month and number of hours spent participating in overall IDA 
program activities are used to measure facilitation. It was possible not to spend any hours in either 
activity during a given month. Both interval and dichotomous measures of each of these variables 
are included.  
 
Other studies using ADD data across all 14 IDA programs evaluate additional institutional 
characteristics including incentives such as savings match rate, which varied across the IDA programs, 
expectations such as savings targets, and facilitation, measured by direct deposit (Sherraden 2008; 
Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner, & Ssewamala, 2005; Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004). Within CAPTC, 
match rates were 2:1 for homeownership and 1:1 for all other asset goals confounding our ability to 
separate motivation derived from saving incentives from motivation derived by savings goal. Thus 
we do not examine match rate in these analyses. Direct deposit was not evaluated as it was 
determined that the emphasis of these analyses would be on informational and programmatic 
facilitation.  
 
Study limitations 
As indicated previously, this is a preliminary analysis of differences in saving performance by 
disability status. We believe, in a study of this nature, it is best to proceed cautiously and 
conservatively given that our measure of disability is created through proxy measures and may not 
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fully represent the population of persons with disabilities within ADD. As noted earlier, Wave 4 
ADD data collection will contain a self-identification measure for disability status with a look-back 
component which we hope will address this limitation. Additionally, we emphasize that restraint 
should be taken when interpreting these or any other findings from ADD as participants within 
ADD are both self-selected, because they volunteer to participate in the program, and are program-
selected, because of eligibility criteria they are required to satisfy. Compared to the overall U.S. 
population below 200 percent of the poverty line, ADD participants are more likely to be female, 
African-American, single, never married, more educated, and more likely to be employed (Schreiner 
et al., 2001). Despite these limitations, CAPTC data represent the only random controlled trial of an 
IDA program and have substantial merit as an important data source for analyzing the influence of 
disability status on IDA savings outcomes. We take into consideration these limitations in our 
discussion of study findings. 
 
Data analyses procedures 
We first conducted univariate and bivariate procedures to understand the basic characteristics of the 
sample. An exploration of AMND found that 4 cases in the sample (N=376) had small negative 
values (less than $25) most likely due to recording error. The values of these cases were set at zero. 
A review of AMND’s distribution (range $0 - $90) revealed that 18.35% of the sample (N = 69) had 
a value of zero AMND at Wave 3. Prior analyses of CAPTC interpret a zero balance as indicating 
that someone dropped out of the program, is yet to start saving or as signaling successful 
completion of the program (Mills, Patterson, Orr, & DeMarco, 2004; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2006). 
We considered a zero balance a valid result in the CAPTC experiment, so did not modify the sample 
based on our review of these 69 cases.  
 
We used t-tests and Chi-square procedures to determine whether or not there were any significant 
differences between the disability and non-disability program participants by savings performance, 
individual and household characteristics, and program (institutional) factors. Next, we used a three-
step sequential regression procedure that treated disability, individual, and household characteristics, 
as well as program characteristics as distinct variable blocks to assess their cumulative relationship to 
AMND.  Disability status was entered in the first step.  Individual and household characteristics 
were entered in the second step. The third step included program characteristics.   
 
Results 
 
Table 2 summarizes individual and household characteristics, saving performance, and program 
characteristics for the study sample and compares these statistics by disability status.  As shown in 
Table 2, we identified more than one-third of participants in the CAPTC experimental group as 
experiencing disability at either Wave 2 (2001) or Wave 3 (2003) of data collection (n=145, 39%). 
E X P L O R I N G  S A V I N G  P E R F O R M A N C E  I N  A N  I D A  F O R  P E O P L E  W I T H  D I S A B I L I T I E S  
 
 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
9 
Table 2. Sample Characteristics N=376) 
Variables Whole sample Non-disability subsample Disability subsample 
 n 
Mean or 
Freq 
SD or  
% n 
Mean or 
Freq 
SD or  
% n 
Mean or 
Freq 
SD or  
% 
Disability Status 376         
Dummy Measure (Yes)a  145 38.56       
Working disability  107        
SSDI recipients  28        
SSI recipients  49        
Three-level Categorical Measure          
Non-disability in both waves  231 61.44       
Short-term disability  84 22.34       
Long-term disability  61 16.22       
Individual Characteristics          
Gender (female)* 376 300 79.79 231 175 75.76 145 125 86.21 
Age in Wave I*** 375 36.48 10.48 230 35.06 9.55 145 38.72 11.48 
Education levels 376   231   145   
<=high school  118 31.38  72 31.17  46 31.72 
Some college/Two-year college  209 55.59  125 54.11  84 57.93 
Four-year college or above  49 13.03  34 14.72  15 10.34 
Race 374   231   143   
White  169 45.19  102 44.16  67 46.85 
Black  162 43.32  102 44.16  60 41.96 
Others  43 11.5  27 10.39  16 11.19 
Marital status in Wave III (Yes) 376 107 28.46 231 71 30.74 145 36 24.83 
Employment status (employed)*** 375 290 77.33 231 202 87.45 144 88 61.11 
Household Characteristics          
Household size 375 3.34 1.6 230 3.45 1.67 145 3.17 1.48 
Number of children 376 1.58 1.38 231 1.72 1.45 145 1.35 1.23 
Dummy measure of having 
children at home (yes) 376 269 71.54 231 172 74.46 145 97 66.9 
Household income 349 2241.11 1425.81 220 2352.13 1375.77 129 2051.77 1493.78 
Saving Performance          
AMND* 376 24.00 25.87 231 26.07 26.33 145 20.72 24.85 
Program Characteristics          
Monthly hours of IDA participation 368 2.61 6.19 229 2.76 6.81 139 2.37 5.02 
Dummy measure of IDA 
participation hours (yes) 368 159 43.21 229 102 44.54 139 57 41.01 
Monthly hours of contacting IDA 
staff 373 1.32 4.77 230 1.49 4.8 143 1.05 2.92 
Dummy measure of staff contact 
hours (yes) 373 129 34.58 230 84 36.52 143 45 31.47 
Hours of general financial education 357 3.67 7.77 219 3.81 7.39 138 3.45 8.36 
Dummy measure of general 
financial education (yes) 357 124 34.73 219 82 37.44 138 42 30.43 
Hours of total specific financial 
education 366 5.28 13.38 226 5.98 14.06 140 4.14 12.16 
Dummy measure of special 
financial education (yes)* 366 149 40.71 226 102 45.13 140 47 33.57 
a. 12 cases have both working disabilities and SSDI income, 23 cases have both working disabilities and SSI income, and 9 
cases have both SSDI and SSI income. *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 (comparison between disability and non-disability groups) 
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Among these participants, 61 (42%) experienced disability at both interview waves and 84 
participants experienced disability in either Wave 2 or Wave 3 (58%). Comparing our sub-samples 
with and without disabilities, CAPTC IDA participants with disabilities were significantly more likely 
to be female (86% vs. 76%), older (average age 39 vs. age 35), and less likely to be employed at 
Wave 3 (61% vs. 87%) than IDA participants who did not experience disability. We found no 
significant difference in household characteristics between sub-samples. As for savings performance 
and program participation, CAPTC IDA participants with disabilities had significantly lower AMND 
amounts than participants without disabilities ($20.72 vs. $26.07). Significantly smaller percentages 
of the disability sub-sample participated in asset-specific financial education (34% vs. 45%). 
 
Table 3 presents results of our sequential regression analyses. Model 1 (N=376), showed that 
participants with disabilities saved significantly less on average, per month than those without 
disabilities (consistent with results of independent t-test reported in Table 2). The mean of AMND 
in IDAs for participants with disabilities is about $5.50 less than those without disabilities. In other 
words, a CAPTC participant with disability saved nearly $400 less than her non-disabled counterpart 
during the five years of CAPTC IDA participation. Participants with disabilities, therefore, also had 
fewer match funds (from $400 to $800) in their program accounts because of the difference in 
saving performance.   
 
Model 2 (N=344) added individual and household characteristics, of which age, education, race, 
household size, and household income were significantly related to saving performance.  Results 
from Model 2 indicate that participants’ age was positively related to AMND, with a marginal effect 
equal to 60 cents per month for each additional year in age. College graduates saved on average 
$12.78 more than participants with an education level less than or equal to high school. The AMND 
for Black respondents was about $14 and $10 less, respectively, than it was for participants of White 
and “Other” ethnic groups. Household size was negatively related to saving performance. The 
addition of one more member to a household reduced the AMND by $2.21 per month. Monthly 
household income had a positive association with AMND. Controlling for other variables in the 
model, if household income of participants increased from the first quartile of the household 
income variable range ($1,339) to the median ($2,000), the monthly net saving would increase by 
$2.40. After these differences are controlled for, disability status remains significant in Model 2 with 
the difference in AMND between participants with and without disabilities increasing from $5.50 in 
Model 1 to $6.60 in Model 2. This suggests that the difference in AMND may not be entirely 
explained by discrepancies in employment and income. If this were the case, the inclusion of these 
variables should have diminished the effects of disability.  Instead, Model 2 indicates that 
participants with disabilities, even with similar employment status and household income, still had 
less AMND compared to participants without disabilities. 
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Table 3. Disability and Saving Performance: Results of Hierarchical Regression Models  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Disability status (Yes/No) -5.484* -6.572* -5.424* 
 (2.70) (2.78) (2.67) 
Individual Characteristics    
Age at baseline survey  0.594*** 0.507*** 
  (0.15) (0.15) 
Gender (Female)  -3.194 -3.023 
  (4.05) (3.86) 
Education Level    
   <=High school (ref. group)    
    
   Some/Two year college  3.910 1.072 
  (2.79) (2.78) 
   Four-year college or above  12.78** 10.29* 
  (4.33) (4.58) 
Race    
   Others (ref. group)    
    
   Black  -10.49* -7.668 
  (4.32) (4.14) 
   White  3.396 5.495 
  (4.48) (4.28) 
Marital Status (Married or not)  -0.798 -0.522 
  (3.60) (3.43) 
Employment Status (Yes/Not)  0.516 0.365 
  (3.19) (3.02) 
Household Characteristics    
Household Size  -2.211* -2.132* 
  (0.96) (0.95) 
Number of Children  3.119 2.804 
  (4.03) (3.84) 
Household Income  0.00365*** 0.00347*** 
  (0.00099) (0.00095) 
Institutional Characteristics    
Hours of program participation (Yes/No)   0.433 
   (4.13) 
Hours of staff contact (Yes/No)   7.782 
   (4.41) 
Hours of general financial education (Yes/No)   2.039 
   (2.69) 
Hours of specific education (Yes/No)   8.201** 
   (2.86) 
Constant 26.07*** 3.199 -1.304 
 (1.74) (9.10) (8.77) 
Observations 376 344 344 
R-squared 0.01 0.24 0.30 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
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Model 3 included four dummy variables of program characteristics (institutional factors) which 
measured programmatic supports available to participants. The coefficients of these four factors 
were positive; however, only participation in asset-specific financial education was significant with a 
marginal effect on AMND equal to $8.20.  Although not statistically significant separately, the joint 
effect of the other three program characteristics (participation in program activities, staff contact, 
and general financial education) were highly significant (F(3, 327)=3.03, p=.03) and suggest a 
composite measure should be explored in future research. With the inclusion of institutional factors, 
Model 3 retained the same significant individual and household characteristics as Model 2 except the 
race variable. Being older, college educated, having more income, and having smaller household size 
are predictors of higher AMND. Disability status remained significant in Model 3; this variable had 
the smallest effect size in the three models.  A closer examination of the three models reviews that 
inclusion of institutional variables in Model 3 tends to buffered about one percent of the variance in 
AMND that is explained by disability status. 
 
Discussion 
 
Findings from analyses conducted in this study indicate that lower-income people with disabilities 
can save in IDAs. However, results of this study showed that people with disabilities saved less 
about $5-60 than their counterparts without disabilities. That they save less on average per month 
than people without disabilities is an important and new finding that has implications for 
understanding the effectiveness of IDAs in helping people with disabilities leverage assets obtained 
through IDA programs.  Lesser individual savings results in fewer matching funds. To the extent 
that people with disabilities save less in IDAs, their resulting assets provide less economic power. 
Why participants with disabilities saved less in CAPTC than participants without disabilities and 
what implications this had for attaining their savings goal cannot be fully explained by the current 
study.  Future research incorporating data collected in Wave 4 of CAPTC could explore this further.  
 
The potential impact of disability status on AMND through institutional factors adds support to the 
developing institutional theory of saving. The positive relationship between asset-specific financial 
education and increased AMND may indicate the importance of targeted education and specific 
knowledge development for active planning and saving. Analyses of retirement and long-term care 
planning and saving for people with (Putnam & Tang, 2008) and without disabilities (Morgan & 
Eckert, 2004; Muller 2001/2002) find similar outcomes. However, it is important to note that results 
of this study also show that the sub-sample of participants with disabilities in ADD CAPTC were 
less likely to participate in asset-specific financial education (see Table 2). These findings suggest that 
extra outreach to this subgroup may be important to encourage participation in an effective aspect 
of the program. Identification of physical access and participation barriers may be important as well. 
 
The finding that program characteristics such as general financial education, degree of staff contact 
and hours of program participation were only significant when combined, indicate that people with 
disabilities may engage with or value program features differently than people without disabilities. In 
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interpreting this finding, the fact that some of the participants categorized as “having a disability” 
became so during the study and did not begin the program holding this status must be kept in mind. 
It could be that successful savings performance for ADD participants experiencing a disability after 
entering the program may be enhanced by intense programmatic contact at certain stages of this 
transition to the disability status.   
 
Results of this study, in relation to the significance of institutional factors and the unique ways in 
which they may operate for the people with disabilities participating in ADD, warrant further 
investigation. Other institutional characteristics found to be significant in previous research, such as 
match rates, savings targets, and direct deposit were not examined here. Additional analyses of all 14 
IDA programs within ADD are planned and will permit analysis of variance in these other well 
studied program features on savings performance for participants with and without disabilities. 
Future research may also uncover additional institutional or programmatic factors that may be 
important in promoting saving and asset accumulation among people with disabilities. 
 
Although this study finds that institutional factors can slightly decrease the effects of disability 
status, that individual and household characteristics still matter is of substantial note. The potential 
of factors such as college education, increased age, higher household income, and fewer household 
members to influence saving performance in an IDA should be seriously examined.  Different 
institutional characteristics may be needed for an IDA program that targets lower- income people 
with disabilities who may lack a college education.  Further, the work requirement that defines 
eligibility for participation in the CAPTC and other IDA program may have  restrict participation of 
many low- income persons with disabilities particularly because employment rates of persons with 
disabilities are low (Cornell University, 2006; Houtenville, Erickson, & Lee, 2007). Others may be 
ineligible due to participation in disability programs with asset limits that are not waived for IDA 
participants. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A conservative interpretation of our results would indicate that IDA programs should pay specific 
attention to institutional factors and their ability to improve the savings performance of people with 
disabilities.  IDA and asset building policies should consider the potential of IDA programs to 
improve the asset holdings of people with disabilities (as they do for people without disabilities).  
Policy makers should also be mindful that many people with disabilities may be unable to qualify for 
IDA participation based on employment status; even when they do qualify, disability status may 
negatively influence savings outcomes.  Moreover, institutional characteristics that have proven 
effective for IDA program participants without disabilities may be less useful for people with 
disabilities in their current configurations. Additional research into the relationship between 
individual and family resources and savings outcomes for people with disabilities is also warranted.  
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Finally, IDA programs and policies should acknowledge the fact that research on the relationship of 
disability status to asset accumulation is in its infancy.  Evidence to support program and policy 
development is greatly needed to ensure IDA programs are equitable and effective for both people 
with and without disabilities. We are hopeful that results of this study and planned future research 
with data from CAPTC Wave 4 will contribute to knowledge in this emerging field as well as to 
evidence-based policy. 
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